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THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS
     In 1895, when  the F ifteen th Amendmen t turned  twen ty-five, nobody ce lebrated. 
In South Carolina that year, Ben T illman's faction passed a temporary registration
law to prevent blacks from voting in a referendum on calling a disfranchising
convention, insured that the convention would be called by stuffing the ballot box,
struck a deal with the faction's "upper class" opponents to disfranchise many poor
whites along with nearly all blacks, and proclaimed the new constitution without
offering  the  vo ters  a chance to  reject it.  F ive  years  earlier, the D em ocratic
leadership of M ississippi had jammed through a similar constitutional
disfranchising scheme.  By  1895, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, and Arkansas had
buttressed white Dem ocratic supremacy with the poll tax, while every other
ex-Confederate state except North Carolina had enacted some direct restriction on
voting with the primary intent and effect of disproportionately disadvantaging
African-Americans.1
     Ninety-five years later, Virginia has a black governor, 24 blacks and 10
Hispanics sit in Congress, there are 417 black and 124 Hispanic state legislators and
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4388 black and 1425 Hispanic officers of city or county governments, six of the ten
largest cities in the country have or have had black mayors, and in the eleven states
tha t seceded, 61 %  of the  blacks and  70%  of the  whites w ere  reg istered  to vote  in
1986.2  South Carolina's nomination of an African-Am erican for Governor in 1990
was hardly considered worthy of national remark.  No one, even in the Reagan
Adm inistration, the m ost reactionary presidency s ince C oo lidge's, proposed openly
to restrict the suffrage of any non-whites.
     W hy  the  contrast?  In  this  paper, I will argue  tha t a detailed  comparison o f
certain aspects of the tw o R econstructions will help us to understand both more
adequately .  On the one  hand , by  making  us  more conscious about the problematic
nature of facts that are too often taken for granted, the comparison provides a new
approach to the classic question of why the First Reconstruction failed.  On the
other hand, the ana logy th rows a differen t ligh t on  controversies over the in tent,
deve lopment, consequences, and desirab ility of the 1965 V oting R igh ts A ct, its
interpretations, amendmen ts, and proposed relaxation. 
     In a 1989 essay, the scholar who invented the term "Second Reconstruction" for
the period since 1954, and who almost singlehandedly initiated the comparative
history o f America's First R econstruction, confessed, in  his  typ ically ironic  tone, to
failure.  Not only had the First Reconstruction failed, remarked C. Vann
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W oodward, but he personally had failed "to find a satisfactory explanation for the
failure of R econstruction."3  In contrast, Eric Foner, no doubt constrained by the
textbook format of h is recent m asterw ork on  Reconstruction, could not afford
W oodward's rather coy reticence.  Foner enumerated six reasons for the demise of
Reconstruction: violence, "the weakening of Northern resolve," the inability of
southern Republicans to develop a long-term appeal to whites, factionalism and
corruption w ithin  the  GOP, the rejection o f land refo rm , and chang ing  pa tterns in
the national and international econom ic system.4  
     As adm iring of the work of both W oodward and Foner as I am, I suggest that
rather different and perhaps more satisfying answers to the general question of why
Reconstruction failed may be obtained by simultaneously narrowing and
leng then ing the inquiry.  To render the  problem  tractab le, as w ell as to make it more
relevant to the Voting Rights Act, I will concentrate solely on politics.  Instead of
comparing race relations in post-Civil War America to those in other
post-emancipation societies, I will analogize it to post-World W ar II Am erica.  And
instead o f truncating the first period a t 1877 , when the revo lution w as no t on ly
unfinished, it was not even clearly over, I will carry my analysis through the turn of
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the nineteenth century.
     The cen terpiece  of R econstruction, Rad ical Republicans thought, was the vote. 
"A  man with a  ba llot in  his  hand ," the abo litionist W endall Phillips declaim ed, "is
the master of the situation.  He defines all his other rights.  W hat is not already
given him, he takes...The B allot is opportunity, education, fair play, right to office,
and elbow-room."5  But Republicans were not, even as they celebrated passage of
the Fifteenth Amendm ent in 1870, so naive as to believe that the right to vote was
self-executing, as Phillips's and other similar statements might seem to imply.6  All
too aware of the difficulty of struggles over black enfranchisement even in the
North, where b lacks were largely disfranchised in 1865 and  where w hite voters
rejected racially equal suffrage in eight of eleven referenda from 1865 to 1869,
Radicals fully realized that enfranchisement required practical safeguards against
evasion and retrogression.  From  the first draft introduced into Congress of what
were  to becom e the Fourteenth  and F ifteenth  Amendm ents, therefore, proponents
of racially impartial suffrage banned abridgement, as well as outright denial of the
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right to vote of any loyal, non-criminal, adult male citizen.7  Although they never
specified in reports or floor debates from  1866 to 1869 exactly what practices
"abridgement" prohibited, Congressmen probably had in mind the widely known
example of New  York, where Martin Van B uren and his allies in the "Albany
Regency" had imposed  a $250 property requirement on blacks, but not on w hites,
in 1821, and where attempts to repeal the discriminatory standard had failed,
though by ever closer margins, in referenda in 1846, 1860, and 1869.8       The
meaning of the word "abridge" was by no means the only ambiguity in the
deceptively  sim ple  Fifteenth  Amendm ent.  After Congress enfranchised b lacks in
ten  southern  states through  the  1867  M ilitary  Reconstruction A ct, w hite  Dem ocrats
in Georgia, reasoning that the right to vote did not imply the right to hold office,
expelled all the blacks elected to the subsequent state legislature.9  W hen, in 1869,
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Congress first explicitly guaranteed the right of African-Am ericans to hold office,
then deleted that provision from  the Fifteenth Amendm ent, did they do so, as
historian W illiam G illette claims, with the intent of allowing racial restrictions on
officeholding?  Or, as prominent Radical Congressmen and Senators asserted at the
time, w as the  connection  be tween voting and  officeho lding so obv iously close as to
make fo rm al protection  of the  latter superfluous, and  migh t mention ing  it explic itly
be taken to imply that other restrictions were allowed? 10   Similarly, did Congress 's
deletion of bans against literacy and property tests, after it had initially included
such prohibitions in the F ifteenth Am endm ent, indicate that such qualifications,
which  everyone recognized w ould have a disproportionate im pact on  blacks, w ere
constitutiona l?11  Or, as the Radicals' position on the controversy over officeholding
suggested, did the broad statement of the Fifteenth Am endment, together with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth, outlaw literacy, property, and all other
similar qualifications?        How w ide was congressional power under section 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendm ent?  Did it grant Congress almost unlimited control over
local, state, and federal elections, as Democrats and many Radicals agreed during
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the 1869  debates?12  In particu lar, d id it authorize Congress to  proh ibit indiv iduals
from interfering with the right to vote of other individuals, and could C ongress
regula te elections in an  attempt to  elim inate fraud?   Or was section 2  essentia lly
meaningless, as Dem ocrats  claimed whenever Congress considered b ills to
implement the Fifteenth Am endment after it had passed?13  To w hat degree did the
Fifteenth Amendm ent, combined with the Fourteenth, constitute a national
guarantee, which might be enforced by courts, as well as congress, of fundam ental
rights, including the right to be protected by state governments against violence?
     Acting w ithin  two m on ths of the  proc lam ation o f the passage  of the  Fifteenth
Amendm ent,14 Republicans in Congress sought to protect every male citizen's right
to vote against interference through violence, intimidation, or bribery by any
persons or groups, official or unofficial.  The far-reaching law, which still forms the
basis of national protective legislation, undercuts the arguments of those historians
who  claim tha t Reconstructionists w ere  constitutiona l conservatives, seriously
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constrained by traditional theories of federalism.15  W ithin a year, Congress had
passed two m ore election acts, one supervising congressional elections from
registration through the counting of ballots, and the other granting the President
extensive pow ers to suppress the K u Klux Klan and similar conspiracies.16  In 1875,
the House passed  an even stronger "Force Bill," providing m ore severe penalties,
widening the scope of federally criminalized violent offenses, and prohibiting
excessive  po ll taxes (an  ind ication  tha t Repub licans be lieved  tha t the  Fifteenth
Am endment at least allowed Congress to forbid tests that did not explicitly mention
race).  Dem ocratic defiance and the disillusionm ent of some R epublicans prevented
the  Senate  from acting  on  the  bill.17  In the next Congress in which they composed
majorities of bo th houses, that of 1890, the R epub licans came w ithin  a sing le vote
of passing  the  most ex tensive b ill in A merican  his tory that a imed at corruption in
elections.18
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     The F ifteenth Amendm ent and the Enforcement Acts were more effective than
many scholars contend,19 and ex tensive b lack  voting continued  long after 1877. 
Tables 1 and 2 give two incomplete and inadequate glimpses of the process.  In the
early part of Reconstruction, b lacks typ ically e lected  from 250 to  over 300  state
legislators and congressmen - about a sixth of the total - from the eleven states that
actually joined the Confederacy.20  They a lso composed a  quarter of the delega tes to
the ten state conventions that reshaped the southern constitutional order between
1867 and 1869.21  In the mid-1870s, there was a dramatic plunge in the number of
African -American  officeholders e lected , but thereafter, the total sh rank gradually. 
At the end of the 1880s, as more southern states began to adopt laws restricting the
suffrage, the num ber of b lack  legislators w as com parable to that in 1970, five years
after the passage o f the V oting Rights A ct.  
     Perhaps most interestingly, the series beginning in 1868 is almost a perfect
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mirror im age of that a  centu ry later, the  pa ttern  of decay in  the  first inversely
reflecting  tha t of grow th in  the  second , with re latively  flat periods  of little change in
the middle of each.  Since the Fifteenth Amendm ent and the Voting Rights Act
were roughly analogous laws, and since each was followed by a series of enforcing
and strengthening acts, the stark divergence in the trends in officeholding demands
explanation.
 (Tab le 1 about here.)
      Although b lacks ' first preference, then  as now, was to be represen ted  by  peop le
of their own race , ceteris paribus, they continued to vote in large percentages even
after widespread black officeholding becam e infeasible.  As Table 2 shows, three
years after Rutherford B. Hayes symbolically confined U.S. troops to their barracks
in the South, an estimated two-thirds of the adult male blacks were recorded as
voting, and two-thirds of those managed to have their votes recorded for Jam es A.
Garfield, whom  they had nearly all, no doubt, supported,  for President.  Lest it be
thought tha t the h igh black turnout, which  would be very respectable a century
later, was a  fluke, or that Dem ocrats allow ed it only because  national elections were
less important to them than those closer to hom e, the second row averages estimates
for one gubernatorial contest in each of the eleven states during the decade of the
eighties.  Despite the fact that none of these elections took place on the same day as
voters balloted for president, six out of ten blacks turned out, and a similar
percentage of them supported the Republican, Greenbacker, or other
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anti-Democratic candidate.22  Even in the 1890s, after several states had restricted
the suffrage, nearly half of the blacks are estimated to have voted in key
gubernatorial con tests, although  the  Populist-Dem ocratic  ba ttles were  sufficiently
severe that Dem ocrats pushed fraud to new levels.
(Tab le 2 about here.)
     W hat accounts for the trend in the nineteenth century figures and for the
differences between the nineteenth and  twentieth century patterns?
    The late nineteenth century counterrevolution took time, and its mechanisms
were complex.  There were five elements in the reversal of political Reconstruction,
none sufficient by itself, all working together, but, roughly speaking, following a
predictable developmental sequence:  violence, fraud, structural discrimination,
statuto ry suffrage  restriction, and  constitutiona l disfranchisem ent.23   
     Violence was im portant, no t only because it killed off or scared off southern
Republican leadersh ip, as is often noted , but also because it transfixed  northern
Republicans.  The extent of Reconstruction violence and its political nature have
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been rightly stressed.  Between the gubernatorial election in April and the
presidential election in Novem ber of 1868, for instance, Louisiana D em ocrats,
according to a congressional investiga tion, killed 1081 persons, m ostly black.  In
St. Landry Parish alone in that six month period, as many as 200
African-Americans fell to the "Knights of the W hite Cam elia" - about four times as
many as died in the whole South during the civil rights movem ent of the 1950s and
60s.24  46 blacks were massacred in M emphis and 34 in New  Orleans in 1866;
25-30 at M eridian, M ississippi in 1871, and 35 at Vicksburg in 1874; 105 at the
tiny ham let of Co lfax, Louisiana on Easter Sunday, 1873, including 40 or so after
they had laid down their arms and surrendered.25  This  ex tensive, system atic
political terrorism has no parallel in the modern civil rights movem ent, and in sheer
extent, it far surpassed the lynching spree of the 1890s.26  Reconstruction violence
astonished, mesm erized, and sometimes paralyzed the national Republican leaders,
who  devoted much - too much - of their legislative attention, as well as a great
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many "Bloody Shirt" speeches, to the topic.
     The  attention w as excessive  because v iolence w as a re latively  po litically
ineffective as well as a dangerous weapon for a conservative,
upper-class-dominated group such as the southern Dem ocrats to employ.  If
violence had permanently inhibited the political opposition, one would expect
presidentia l returns from coun ties where there  were  well-known v iolent incidents in
the 1860s and 70s to  show a once-and-for-a ll destruction of the R epublican  vote. 
Table 3 demonstrates that this was not the case.  In nine of twelve southern counties
in which there were well-known "riots" or extensive assassinations, Republicans
received approximately the same proportion of the votes as there were blacks in the
population in the election after the incidents.27  Even in the remaining three, the
Republicans polled some votes.  Furthermore, Establishment violence is costly, for
those who own and  control property and pow er have much to lose if the labor force
leaves28 or figh ts back by  sabotag ing property.  And outside the reg ion, the southern
whites' reputation for violent oppression of blacks fueled campaigns for national
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intervention.29  In sum, the direct po litical effect of vio lence, though s ign ificant,
cannot, by itself, account for the decline of black voting in the nineteenth century.
(Tab le 3 about here.)
     Fraud was probably more significant than violence, as composing election
retu rns becam e a  recognized  art form, and excuses for the loss of officia l ba llots
stretched even the southern capacity for hyperbole.  M ississippi officials, for
instance, reported that horses and  mules had developed a taste for ballot boxes.30 
Governor Sam uel D. McE nery of Louisiana, a zealous enforcer of the legislative
will, stated that his state's election law "was intended to make it the duty of the
governor to treat the law as a fo rm ality  and count in  the  Dem ocrats ."  V irginia
elections, according to the author of the state's chief election statute, were "crimes
against popular governm ent and treason against liberty."  "Any time it was
necessary," reported a delegate to the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901,
whites w ho  controlled the b lack belt "could  pu t in ten, fifteen , twenty o r thirty
thousand Negro votes."  "It is no secret," a leader of the 1890 M ississippi
Constitutional C onvention adm itted, "that there  has not been a  full vo te and  a fa ir
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count in M ississ ippi since  1875."31  But C ongress often  unseated counted-in
candidates, and R epublicans twice almost succeeded  in strengthening laws against
electoral chicanery.32  Like v iolence, moreover, fraud w as a  dangerous device for a
government of the "best men," one whose propagandistic staple, in the South and
especially in  the  North, w as the  charge that R econstructionists had  been  corrupt.33
     The third m eans of accomplishing the counterrevolution, structural
discrimination, involved such tactics as gerrymandering, the substitution of at-large
for single-member-district elections and appointive for elective means of filling
offices , annexations, and the adoption of non-statutory white prim aries.  B y
severely constraining the number of offices that anti-Democratic parties could hope
to cap ture, even in  a fa ir election, structural changes reduced  the  am ount o f overall
violence and fraud necessary for the Dem ocrats to carry elections, concentrated the
opposition's attention on a few potentially winnab le seats, dispirited the Dem ocrats'
adversaries, especially in districts where they had no chance to win, and increased
the number of legislators willing to support further attacks on ethnic and political
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minorities.34  
     Gerrymanders were the paradigm  exam ple of this strategy.  Tw o of the m ost
impressive ones were the congressional monstrosities perpetuated in South Carolina
and M ississippi.  (S ee Figures  1 and  2 and  Tables 4 and  5.)  In the 1860s and early
1870s, Radical Repub licans drew  roughly  equi-popu lous and  compact d istricts that,
with the exception  of the  M ississippi F irst D istrict after 1873, d id not outrageously
concentrate the white population.  Dem ocrats played by no such rules, constructing
the bizarre South Carolina Seventh, which contained the homes of two R epublican
incumbents and sliced across county lines in order to pack in every possible black
voter, and the notorious Mississippi "shoestring" Sixth, which tracked the river for
the length of the state and contained so much of the black population as to make the
other five districts easy to carry with a modicum of violence and fraud.  The
outcomes in the districts, as Table 5 shows, were entirely as predicted.  W ell-known
gerrymanders reduced the chances of electing b lack o r black-favored  white
congressional cand idates in .cp8other states,35 and similar discriminatory games no
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doubt took place on the local and state legislative levels.36
(Tab les 4  and 5 and Figures 1  and 2 about here.)
     Although violence, fraud, and restructuring could usually keep political dissent
in check, they could not eliminate it.  Nineteenth century Dem ocrats rightly feared
national anti-violence and anti-corruption bills before legal disfranchisement, for
there w as a core of black political strength  to build  on  if southern  Dem ocrats  could
be forced  to allow "a free ballot and a fair count."37   The final solution to the
problem s of political dissent and  black su ffrage w as the adoption  of statutory
restrictions such as registration and secret ballot laws (the latter often serving as de
facto literacy tests), and constitutional provisions, such as poll taxes and literacy or
property qualifications.  The first set of laws often shrank dissent so that the second
set could be imposed.38  It is these  latter laws, along w ith the form al white primary
that often attended them, that first attracted national legislative and judicial attention
after 1930.
     W hy was there no move to attack the discriminatory southern electoral
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structures,39 which w ere  widely known and  condem ned in  the  late  nineteen th
century,40 and why w ere congressional efforts to punish violence and prevent fraud
much less successful than in the period since 1957?  There are two answers to these
questions:  congressional partisanship, and judicial perfidy.  Tables 6 and 7 present
a remarkably sharp and little-noticed contrast.  Civil rights was an entirely partisan
issue in the nineteenth century, but, in the north at least, voting rights has enjoyed
nearly  unanimous support since 1957 .  That partisanship  he lped consolidate
Republican support for civil rights in the postbellum period has often been noted,
and R epub licans have  repeatedly been derided  for it.41  M any Republicans did not
"really" support black righ ts, the line goes, but only  "expediently"  endorsed b ills
under the party whip.  .cp4
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     W hatever the validity of this argument, its converse surely holds for the
Dem ocrats.42  From 1866 to the turn of the century, not a single Dem ocrat in the
House or Senate ever vo ted in  favor of a piece of civil rights leg islation!  N orthern
Dem ocrats repeatedly defended southern violence and fraud or denied their obvious
ex istence , and they  staunch ly supported the endless filibusters - fo r instance , a
month in the Senate in 1890 - against civil rights laws.43  This was true in spite of
the fact that a considerable num ber of Dem ocrats defected from  their party's racist
tradition from time to time on local issues in the North.  As governor of New York,
for instance, G rover C leveland  signed a  school in tegration m easure that app lied  to
M anhattan in 1883; and Governor George Hoadly of Ohio convinced some
Dem ocrats to  vote for school integration bills in that sta te's leg islature in 1884. 
Dem ocrats  all over the N orth e ither supported  or acqu iesced in  the  passage of state
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integrated public accomm odations laws after the Supreme Court's abrogation of the
1875 national civil rights law in 1883.44  It was neither constituency pressure nor
personal racist belief that kept Dem ocrats from backing voting rights bills in the
nineteen th century, for at home, some w ere w illing to defec t from the party's
traditional racism.  The im perative that drove big-D  Dem ocrats to abandon sm all-d
democratic ideals in the nineteenth century was clearly the drive for national
political power.
(Tab les 6  and 7 about here.)
     Table 7 shows that since 1957, support for voting rights has been overwhelming
and constant for no rthern  Dem ocrats in both houses of C ongress, and for northern
Republicans in the Senate.45  There was a substantial anti-VRA shift am ong House
Repub licans du ring the N ixon A dm inistration, but that "southern  strategy"  qu ickly
faded.  The southern pa ttern is one of a dram atic shift toward civil rights, most
strikingly among House Dem ocrats, who  opposed the extremely weak 1957 law
unan im ously , but backed  the m uch  more stringen t 1982 Act by a ten -to-one ratio. 
At the heigh t of the  Reagan A dm inistration 's power, six out of ten southern
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Republicans voted for the V oting Rights A ct on final passage.  
     W hy was there such unanimity within and such division between the parties on
this issue in the nineteenth century, and why d id the two centuries' patterns contrast
so starkly?  Tables 8 and 9 suggest some tentative answers.  Table 8 demonstrates
tha t the  nineteen th cen tury C ongress w as much less stable  in m em bership than  in
more recent years.  The standard deviation of the R epublican percentage of House
members for the nineteen sessions from 1865 through 1901 was more than four
times as high as that fo r the seventeen sessions from 1957  through  1989 .  Tha t in
the Senate was nearly twice as high in the first as in the second period.  Politicians,
of course, took note  of such  fac ts, James G. Blaine, for instance, remark ing  in h is
memoirs that new m embers composed majorities of nine of the ten sessions of the
House from 1861 to 1881.46
(Tab le 8 about here.)
     That it was not the fickleness of the nineteenth century electorate that led to the
relatively extreme fluctuations in congressional representation is substantiated by
Table 9, which shows that in presidential elections, it is the recent period that is
unstable, while the earlier one was comparatively immobile.  In both the percentage
of the popular vote and that of the electoral vote, the standard deviation in the last
nine presidential contests has been more than twice that in the nine elections from
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1868 through 1900.  W hat are we to m ake of the inconsistencies in these patterns,
and what implications do they have for the fate of voter protections by the national
government?
(Tab le 9 about here.)
     I have no good answer to  the  first question.  A s Peter Argersinger has recently
pointed out, historians have just begun to examine most structural questions about
nineteenth century non-southern politics.  W e do not know w hether the "swing
ratio" was different in the last century, how unequal and how partisan congressional
and legislative apportionm ents were in general, and to what extent structural
characteristics of the political system m ight account for the instability of
congressional results.47  For the  years  since 1946 , the most recent work rejects
"structura l" explanations in favor of "political" ones.  "D ivided party control," Gary
Jacobson contends, " reflects, rather than  thwarts, popular preferences..." 48  M ass
attitudes might, however, account for much less of the dissonance between
congressional and  presidential returns in the 1800s.
     The consequences of the d iffe rences between centuries seem to me c learer. 
W hen they  arrived in  W ashington in  the  nineteen th cen tury, congressm en had little
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identity apart from their political party, and few remained long enough to develop
one.  They therefore naturally  adop ted  the ir party 's dom inant v iew .  As the Senate
leader of the fight for the Fair Elections Bill of 1890 phrased it, a free ballot was the
"very definition of R epublican ism ."49  The only way to alter the party identity was
to experience a series of whipsawing elections, such as those from 1890 through
1894, which first leveled Republican incumbents, and then did the same thing to the
Dem ocrats, resulting in the retirement of large numbers of core members of each
party.  
     As for presidential elections in the late nineteenth century, they were so close,
and candidates befo re "civ il service reform" w ere  so dependent on  party activists
and so independent of nonpartisan  special in terest groups, com pared  to their
counterparts today, that they had to enliven the faithful with appeals to traditional
issues - the Civil W ar and its associated race issues, as well as the tariff and
monetary po licy .  Furtherm ore, since R epub licans rea listica lly believed that w ith
anything like a fair count, they could carry some southern states during this period,
and since Democrats needed every southern electoral vote to win the presidency,
control o f the sou thern ba llot box  was crucial to both  parties.  By con trast, only in
1960 and 1976 in recent years have the tw o parties closely contested southern
electoral votes.  Usually, the Republicans have been able to count on them, whether
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blacks voted overwhelming ly for the  Dem ocrats  or no t.  Repub lican p residents
therefore have had  little incentive to  oppose even  a strengthened  VRA, while
Dem ocrats, heavily dependent on their black constituents if they were to have a
chance of carrying  a nationa l election, have had  no  choice but to  support civ il righ ts
en thusiastica lly.  
     As far as minority voting rights are concerned, in the nineteenth century, the
parties were too competitive, too "responsible," too dependably comm itted to a
program, and the voters were too civicly conscious to let elites stray from
orthodoxy.  Black votes counted for too much nationally.  In this view, it is the
presidential landslides, the durability of congressional incumbents, the decline of
party loyalty am ong voters and elites, and the inattention of the public in the last
generation that explain why voting rights for blacks and browns has become a
consensus issue.  The F irst Reconstruction died, I am suggesting, from too much
democracy, while the Second has thrived precisely because competition has
shriveled.
     Even if political conditions had favored congressional action on civil rights after
1874, the Supreme Court would probably have invalidated or undermined any
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resulting laws.  During the 1880s, to be sure, in Ex parte Siebold50, Ex parte Clarke,51
and Ex parte Yarbrough,52 the high court interpreted Congress's plenary power under
Article I, section 4  to regulate the "times, places and  manner of holding elections"
to Congress broadly enough to allow it to guarantee peaceable assembly and restrict
fraud  and v iolence.  These decisions encouraged  the  sponsors of the 1890 F air
Elections B ill.  
     But two disastrous opinions of 1876 in U.S. v. Reese,53 and U.S. v. Cruikshank54 had
ruled unconstitutional or largely unenforceable those sections of the 1870-72
Enforcement Acts that attempted to protect all citizens against violence or fraud,
state-sponsored or private, in connection with state or local elections.  Kentucky
officia ls had  refused  to accept the  ba llots of citizens because they w ere  black , while
Louisiana had both failed to protect the victims of the Colfax "riot" and to indict the
perpetrators of that largest racial mass murder in Am erican history.  Yet, according
to Chief Justice M orrison W aite, convictions for these actions in federal courts must
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be overturned.  In each case, the key to the ruling was W aite's insistence that laws
and indictm en ts focus on racial intent.  
     The Enforcement Act at issue in Reese had four relevant sections, the first two of
which mentioned race, while the last two did not, but referred, for instance, to the
"wrongful act or omission as aforesaid" - i.e., the act by which blacks, on account
of their race, were denied the right to becom e legally qualified to vote.55  W aite
ruled  tha t sections  3 and  4 w ere  unconstitutiona l, because they  did  no t directly
mention  race, and  the  on ly nationa l power to  protect c itizens ' righ t to vote  in s tate
and local elections derived from the Fifteenth Am endment.  Likewise, in Cruikshank,
after a p relim inary disqu isition on federa lism  tha t echoed  Dem ocratic  rhetoric
during the "Force Bill" debates, W aite dismissed the case, not on the ground that
the law w as unconstitutional, but because the indictment did not aver that the blacks
were murdered or denied the right to vote because they  were b lack .   
     The decisions were deeply disturbing for four reasons:  M ost fundamentally, the
Lexington blacks were admittedly denied the right to vote on account of their race;
all the victims at Co lfax were black; the laws perfectly fit the situations in each
instance; indictments were filed, and southern juries convicted the malefactors; yet
the Republican Supreme Court let them off.  The R econstruction attempt to use the
normal instrumentalities of government to protect the new citizens had failed at the
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     56U n lik e  th e  F i fte e n th  A m e n d m e n t ,  w h ic h  b a n s  d is c rim in a t io n  i n  v o tin g  " o n  a c c o u n t o f  ra c e ,
co lor ,  o r  p re v io u s  c o n d it io n  o f  se rv i tu d e ,"  th e  F o u r te e n th  A m e n d m e n t  d o e s  n o t m e n tio n  r a c e , a n d ,
o f  co u rse ,  i t w a s  u s ed  e x te n s iv e ly  in  th e  p e rio d  be fo re  19 37  to  g ua ran tee  th e  r igh t s  o f  co rpo ra t ion s ,
w h i c h  h a v e  n o  ra c e .  In  " C o n g r es sio n a l P o w e r u n d e r th e  F o u r te e n th  A m e n d m e n t -  T h e  O rig in a l
U n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  S e c t i o n  F i v e , "  Constitutional Commentary  3  (1 98 6) ,  1 23 -55 ,  M ich ae l  P .  Z uc ke r t
d e m o n s tr a te s  c o n c lu s iv e ly  th a t in  th e  d e b a te  o v e r th e  K u  K lu x  A c t ,  C o n g r e ss  re lie d  o n  th e
F o u rte e n th  A m e n d m e n t , a n d  th a t  i t  a d o p t ed  th e  " sta te  fa ilu r e ,"  ra th e r  th a n  t h e  " s ta te  a c tio n "
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th a t  A m e n d m e n t .   I f  C o n g re ss  a n t ic ip a ted  th a t  a  s ta te  w o u ld  fa i l  to  p ro tec t  i t s
c it iz e n s ag a in st  o th e r  in d iv id u a ls ,  in  o th e r  w o rd s,  C o n g re ss  c o u ld  d ire c t ly  p ro v id e  th a t  p ro tec t io n .
     57T o  co n sid e r  m e re ly  o n e  fa c t ,  ex ten siv e  re p o rts  f ro m  th e  S o u th  em p h a siz in g  p e rse c u t io n  n o t  o n ly
o f  b la ck s ,  bu t  o f  so u th ern  ex -U nio n is t s  w ere  c ru c ia l  in  b u i ld ing  sup po r t fo r  R a d i c a l R e c o n s tru c tio n
fro m  1 8 6 5  o n .  S ee ,  e .g . ,  Fo ne r , Reconstruction,  2 2 5 -2 6 .  T h a t  th e  F o u r te e n th  A m e n d m e n t w a s  m e a n t
to  p ro tec t  t he  r igh t s  o f  a l l  c i t ize ns  i s  a r g u ed  m o st f o rc e fu lly  in  M ic h a e l K e n t C u rtis ,  No State Shall
Abridge:  The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (D urh am :   D uk e  U niv .  Pre ss ,  19 86 ) .
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top .  Second, the Fourteenth  Amendm ent, which sough t, without exp licitly
mentioning race at all, to protect all citizens against discrimination and deprivation
of liberty, was significantly weakened.56  W aite might have torn sections three and
four from  sections one and two and still sustained them  as protections of citizens'
rights to enjoy the suffrage impartially under the Equal Protection or Privileges or
Imm unities Clauses of the Fourteenth Am endm ent.  He m ight then have ruled that
the rights of peaceable assembly and life were guaranteed by the nation under the
Fourteenth Am endm ent, and that they were rights that applied to all citizens, rather
than depending on race.57  Third, by insisting on proof of a racist intent, perhaps
even  of rac ial hostility, W aite was making  it much m ore d ifficu lt to obta in
convictions.  If 105 black bodies did not prove racial animosity, what wou ld? 
Finally, these two decisions severely constrained the potential of congressional
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C T :  G re e n w o o d  P r e ss , 1 9 8 8 ) , 6 5 - 6 6 .   T h e  R e p u b l ica n  m a jo ri ty  in  th e  S e n a te  d id  p a ss  a  b i l l
r e s t o r in g  th e  p ro v is io n s  o f th e  E n f o rc e m e n t A c t th a t th e  C o u r t h a d  v o id e d  in  Reese ,  th i s  t i m e
u n m ista k a b ly  l im it in g  th e ir  s c o p e  to  d e n i a ls  b a se d  o n  r a c e , b u t  th e  D e m o c r a tic -c o n t ro l le d  H o u s e ,
n a tu ra lly , d id  n o t  ac t  o n  th e  b i l l .   C .  P e ter  M a g ra th , Morrison R. Waite:  The Triumph of Character (N e w
Y o rk :     , 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 3 1 .
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action.58      W hatever potentia l the  W aite Court left, the Fuller Court destroyed.59  In
Williams v. Mississippi60 in 1898, the Court denied disfranchised blacks a remedy by
very strictly construing its earlier decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.61  Counsel for the
Chinese laundrym en had shown that a  San  Francisco  ordinance was adop ted  with
both the  intent and  effec t of discrim inating against C hinese .  W hile H enry
W illiams's lawyer quoted extensively from the M ississippi disfranchising
convention of 1890 to demonstrate its racist intent, he apparently took the exclusion
of blacks from the Greenville voter, and, therefore, jury rolls to be proof enough of
the s tate constitution 's discriminatory im pact.  The Court's crabbed reading of Yick
Wo cost W illiams, convicted of murder by an all-white jury, his life.  Yet when a
lawyer representing disfranchised Alabama blacks presented extensive evidence of
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     62 Giles v . Harris,  1 8 9  U .S .  4 7 5  (1 9 0 3 ) .  In  Guinn and Beal v . U.S.,2 3 8  U .S . 3 4 7  (1 9 1 5 ) , th e  O k l a h o m a
g r a n d fa th e r  c la u s e  c a se , C h ie f  J u st ic e  W h ite  e n tir e ly  i g n o re d  Williams a n d  Giles.   In v a lid a tin g  th e
g r a n d fa th e r  c la u s e  e nf r a n c h ise d  n o  b lac k s,  b e c a u se  th a t  p a ten t ly  u n c o n st i tu t io n a l  d e v ice  m e re ly
a l l o w e d  i l l i tera te  w h ites  to  re g is te r  leg a l ly .   T h ro w in g  o u t  Giles,  ho w e v e r ,  w o u ld  al lo w  b lac k s to
v o t e , s in c e  Giles w a s  a  c h a lle n g e  to  th e  a d m in is tr a t io n  o f  th e  A la b a m a  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  A  fo r m e r
m e m b e r  o f  th e  " co n s erv a tiv e "  fa c tio n  o f  th e  D e m o c ra tic  p a rty  in  L o u i sia n a , w h ic h  h a d  o p p o se d  th e
g r a n d fa th e r  c la u se  in  th a t  s ta te 's  c o n st i tu t io n a l  co n v e n t io n  in  1 8 9 7 ,  W h ite  w is h ed  to  ru le  th a t e sc a p e
c lau se  u n c o n st i tu t io n a l ,  bu t  h e  d id  n o t  w a n t  to  en d a n g e r  w h ite  D e m o c ra t ic  s u p re m a c y  in  th e  S o u th .
C o n s e q u e n tly , he  pa id  n o  a t t en t ion  w ha tsoe ve r  to  th e  m os t  ob v io us  p re ce de nts .   F or  a  m ore
e x te n s iv e  d is cu s sio n  o f  th e se  c a se s , s ee  m y  " H o w  to  D e te rm in e  In te n t:   L e s so n s  fro m  L . A . ", S o c i a l
S c ie n c e  W o rk in g  P a p e r 7 4 1  (J u n e , 1 9 9 0 ) , 4 3 -4 8 .
     63W h a t o f  F o n e r 's  six  c a u se s  o f  th e  fa ilu re  o f R e c o n str u c tio n  e n u m e ra te d  a b o v e ?   V io le n c e , I
h a v e  a lr e a d y  d is c u s se d , a n d  la n d  r e fo r m  is  o f fa ir ly  s m a ll  re le v a n c e  to  p o l it ic s , fo r  th e  s a m e
v io le n c e  th a t k e p t b la c k s f ro m  th e  b a llo t  b o x  c o u ld  h a v e  d e p riv e d  th e m  o f  th e ir  p ro p e rty .  N or th ern
re so lv e  d id  n o t w e a k e n  u n ifo rm ly  o r  d e c is iv e ly  u n t i l  m u c h  la te r  in  th e  c e n tu r y .  R e p u b l ic a n
fac t iona l i sm  an d  in a b i l i ty  to  ap p e a l  to  w h ites  co u ld  h a v e  b e e n  o v e rc o m e ,  i f  R e p u b l ica n  v o ter s  c o u ld
h a v e  b e e n  a d e q u a te ly  p ro te c te d  a n d  th e ir v o te s c o u n te d .  T h e  d e p r es sio n s  o f  th e  1 8 7 0 s  a n d  1 8 9 0 s
w ere  c r i t i ca l ,  I t h ink ,  bec au se  th e y  r e m o v e d  f ro m  o f fic e  R e p u b l ica n  el i te s  w h o  w e re  co m m it ted ,  in
v a ry in g  de gre es ,  t o  b l ack  r igh t s .   Fo ne r 's  l i st  i s , in  s u m ,  n o t so  m u c h  w ro n g  a s it  is  in c o m p le te .   I
w o u ld  p u t  m u c h  m o r e  str es s o n  p o l it ic a l s e lf -in te re s t a n d  o n  t h e  ac tio n s  o f p o l it ic ia n s  ( in c lu d in g
jud ge s )  w ho  co n t ro l l ed  m a jo r  po l i ti ca l  i n s t i t u t ion s .
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discriminatory effect, as well as intent, .cp4the Court, in a decision written by the
"libera l" O liver W endall 
Holmes, declared that the C ourt could do nothing, because
suffrage w as a "political question."62
     If, as argued earlier, one line on the tom bstone of Reconstruction, should read
"d ied  of democracy,"  the  next should  have  ch iseled  on  it "and  of the  failu re to
protect dem ocracy."63  The contrast between the actions of the W aite and Fuller
Courts and  those of the  W arren  and even the B urger and R ehnquist Courts cou ld
hardly be s tronger.  
     During  the  Second R econstruction, not only  did  Congress pass and  repeatedly
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strengthen its protections of minority voting rights, but the Supreme Court, with the
exception  of Mobile v. Bolden,64 supported the law  with considerab le vigor.  Gomillion
v. Lightfoot65, the Tuskeegee gerrymander case, ran the film  of the decisions from
Reese to Giles backwards, as it were.  Despite brute intransigence and ingenious
subterfuges by white officials in the nation's most heavily black county, enough
African-Am ericans managed to register to vote to threaten white control of the
town of Tuskeegee.  M acon county R epresentative Sam  Englehardt therefore
pushed through the Alabama legislature 
a bill redefining the boundaries of
Tuskeegee to make it an almost wholly white town.66
     Justice Felix Frankfurter's opinion smashed the "political question" or
"justiciability" roadblock.  Even Frankfurter, who had held back consideration of
rotten borough cases in Colegrove v. Green,67 was shocked by the "strangely irregular
28-sided-figure" draw n to "fence ou t" blacks from  Tuskeegee.  The decision also
reunited the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Am endments, sundered in Reese and
Cruikshank, ruling that a lack of equal protection  through a  racially discriminatory
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electoral s tructure w as also a  denia l of the right to  vo te guaran teed by the F ifteenth
Amendm ent, and resting  its hold ing  on  bo th grounds.  Fina lly, the case im plic itly
ruled  tha t a racially d iscrim inatory in tent could  be  proven  solely  on  the  basis o f its
effect.  Robert Carter of the NA AC P began his oral argument before the Supreme
Court by saying:  "Your Honors, our position is simple.  This is purely a case of
racial discrimination. The purpose of this legislation - Alabama A ct 140 - was
discriminatory."  W hen Justice Douglas asked Carter whether purpose was "the
central aspect of your case", C arter replied "Purpose and e ffect - the effect reveals
the purpose..."68  Although the NA AA CP  introduced no direct evidence of intent, no
"sm oking gun" statem ents, for instance, the Suprem e C ourt ruled in its favor,
declaring that "Acts generally  law ful may become unlawful when done to
accomplish an unlawful end."69  The  nineteen th cen tury decisions  were  tacitly
buried.
     The C ourt continued in the Gomillion tradition  in the  crucial case of Allen v. Board
of Elections.70   Chief Justice Earl W arren held that under section 5 of the 1965
Voting Rights Act, the U.S. Department of Justice could refuse to allow election
laws in Virginia and M ississippi to go into effect even if those laws had no direct
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connection w ith voter registration, but, instead, changed  the structure of elections,
for example, from single m em ber to at-large districts.  In the 1973 case  of White v.
Regester71, Justice Byron W hite introduced the "totality of the circumstances" test
and enumerated factors  that w ere to  be taken into account for an  electoral structure
to be ruled racially discrim inatory.    
     The Supreme C ourt briefly departed from this line of decisions in Bolden, in
which a  plu rality  endorsed Justice Potter Stew art's  op inion that the F ifteenth
Am endment and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required proof of purpose, and
tha t, piece by  piece, the ob jective  ev idence presen ted  by  the  M obile p lain tiffs d id
not sa tisfy that standard.  Bolden's troubled life, however, was cut short after less
than twenty-seven months.  In Rogers v. Lodge72 in 1982, Justice W hite merged the
effec t-based standards o f Regester with the in tent no tions of a series of Fourteenth
Am endm ent cases, and gingerly sidestepped the Bolden plurality ruling .  Four years
later, Justice W illiam B rennan, in  Thornburg v. Gingles,73 focused judicial attention
on three particularly important factors for determining a voting rights violation and
rejected the a ttem pt to  make it m uch m ore d ifficu lt to prove  tha t vo ting  was rac ially
polarized.  Plaintiffs did not have to dem onstrate, said Justice Brennan, that racism
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a rg u m e n t  th a t  s h e  w a n t s to  m a k e .
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was the  sole or m ost importan t cause of differences in voting patterns, but only that
the electorate did, as a matter of fact, split along racial lines.        M ost lawyers and
academics who have studied these developments have approved the five leading
Supreme Court decisions and criticized Bolden.  If the decisions had gone the other
way, or if Congress had  not continued and expanded its protective acts, progress
toward political equality would not only have been stopped, it might well have been
reversed, as it was a cen tury earlier.  Among the few dissenters, the most
comprehensive case has been offered by Abigail Thernstrom.74  W hat is
Thernstrom's argument, and how w ell does it hold up, especially in light of the
events of the First Reconstruction?
     "The aim of the Voting R ights Act - the single aim" Thernstrom asserts, "was
black enfranchisement in the South."  Four years later, in Allen, the U.S. Supreme
Court went well beyond the original intent of the law w hen it "turned a minor
prov ision o f the act - section  5 - into  a m ajor tool w ith w hich to  combat white
resistance  to black power."  N evertheless, presumably because of M ississippi's
notorious record of discrimination and because its attempt to counteract increased
black registration w as so blatant, Thernstrom  grudgingly approves Allen, calling  it
"both co rrect and inev itable."  To her, however, Allen's consequences for other
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jurisdictions are "troubling."  By "implicitly enlarg[ing] the definition of
enfranchisement," the Court made "proportionate ethnic and racial
representation...an entitlement" which requires "gerrym andering to maximize
minority officeholding."  These "large and unanticipated results" brought the nation
to "a point no one envisioned  in 1965."75   M arveling that m inority e lectoral rights
have  en joyed  overw helming  congressiona l support since 1965 , while  efforts to
combat racial and ethnic discrimination in housing and employm ent have been
bitterly opposed, and those in education have completely stalled, Thernstrom seeks
to e liminate the anomaly  by  conv incing  her readers  tha t the  Voting R igh ts A ct is
now only another affirmative action program.76   
     Allen is not the only Supreme C ourt case that she c ritic izes .  White v. Regester's
judgment was "abstruse," its findings of fact, "unexplained assertions of
indeterminate weight" which "lacked coherence."  W ithout a complete definition of
a fa ir dem ocratic  process, which (she apparently  thinks) it was the  Court's duty  to
provide, the list of factors in Regester was "arbitrary ," and  therefore unconstitutional,
because "Arbitrary  federa l interference with local and s tate  electoral a rrangem ents
is in clear violation of the C onstitution..."77  Yet the attempt to codify the decision
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"simplifies w hat cannot be simplified; m akes orderly a process tha t is inheren tly
diso rderly."78  Regester's was a "Chinese menu approach," a formula which "never
worked," in which factors can be chosen "at random" to prove tautologically the
existence of racial discrimination.79  Rogers v. Lodge, she condemns as un faith ful to
Mobile v. Bolden, a decision that she terms "principled, simple, and tight" at one
point, and  condem ns as vague at ano ther.80  Nor does Thernstrom like Thornburg v.
Gingles, because of its rejection of the "multicausal" attack on the statistical methods
which a re com monly used to  de term ine  rac ially  po larized  vo ting , and because it
"distorts the meaning of electoral opportunity..."  If blacks are a minority in a
jurisdiction, she  asserts, they  have  no  right to  any represen tation a t all.81
     Nor are judges the only ones to feel Thernstrom's wrath.  Almost all members of
Congress are, to her, either blind, gullible, unobservant, incompetent, or
M achiavellian.  The m ention of "effect" in section 5 of the original 1965 Voting
Righ ts A ct w as "unnoticed ."  T he  1970  am endm ents "rein forced the act in
unintended  and unforeseen w ays."  "[S]lapdash, inattentive" House m em bers cast
merely "symbolic votes" in 1981, while the strategy of the leading prospective
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opponent of the Voting Rights Act, Rep. Henry Hyde, was so inept that it presented
"a gift" to the bill's supporters, and the R eagan  Adm inistration's indecisiveness
robbed it of any influence whatsoever in the struggle.  Senator Orrin Hatch, the
book's only heroic figure, was a man of considerable "political acumen," who had,
she thinks, the best of all the arguments, but comm anded almost no votes, betrayed
as he  was by  such  am bitious  opportunists as Senator Robert D ole .  By con trast,
Representative D on  Edw ards and  the  "d iehards," a "de term ined m inority hew ing  to
a hard  line" w ithin  the  vo ting  rights  lobby , were  insidiously crafty, seeking to
"deflect scrutiny" of changes in section 2 which aimed at overruling Bolden,
harassing potential witnesses for the other side, and, with their "self-proclaimed
moral superiority" and deplorable perseverance, overwhelming "moderates" who
had "soft hearts and weak stomachs."  Even before 1981, members of Congress, as
well as lobbyists had deliberately obfuscated the voting rights issue by conflating
disfranchisement and dilution.  The black and brown m asses, she thinks, were in no
danger of losing their votes, but by charging that they were, the civil rights forces
could create safe seats for African- and M exican-American politicians.82 
     During  the  1981-82 battle over renew al, Thernstrom charges, the media, "with
few  exceptions , functioned as part o f" the c ivil rights  lobby , and it
"often...suppressed information" that might hurt The C ause.  Judges on the District
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Court for the District of Columbia, along with officials of the Department of
Justice, wantonly ignored decisions of the Supreme Court.  Instead of administering
the V oting  Rights Act honestly, the Justice  Departm ent "has been crea ting detours
around the law" in  an  effort to p rotect and extend  the  influence, not o f m inority
voters, but of minority officeholders.  Those w ho support the Voting R ights Act as
it exists today, she proclaims, are "promoting racial separation," "inhibit[ing]
political integration."83  One w ho makes so many harsh accusations against so many
people can hardly complain when her own work is subjected to scrutiny.
     Although T hernstrom never explic itly describes the  world as she  wou ld like it to
be, her critique implies a vision.  Section 5, the preclearance clause of the Voting
Righ ts A ct, w ou ld have been a llow ed to lapse, perhaps as early  as 1970 , because it
was proposed on ly to meet a tem porary "em ergency ."  Once  discrimination against
southern blacks in the administration of literacy tests had been eliminated and any
southern white efforts to prevent blacks from  registering through som e other
subterfuge had  been restrained , there w ould be no further need for sec tion 5. 
Consequently, that provision, which had been distorted through "radical" decisions
like Allen,  should be repealed, because, as applied , it represents an "extraord inary
usurpation of traditional local prerogatives by federal authorities," by which the
"the career attorneys who roam the halls of the Department of Justice, but seldom
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the s treets o f a southern town" can "override dec isions arrived  at dem ocratically."84
     Section 4 of the law, which bans literacy tests, would presumably remain,
although one who shares the "optimism about Am erican society and its political
process" of the opponents of the 1982 am endm ents, as Thernstrom  manifestly does,
would not expec t a reim position of such  tests  even  if the p roviso  were scrapped . 
Section 2 would be amended to return it to what she thinks was its original
meaning, a  mere  restatement of the  Fifteenth  Amendm ent, conta ining an im plic it
intent test.85  Library floors would be littered with Supreme Court opinions that
would be reversed or made irrelevant - Allen, Regester, Lodge, Gingles.  Am ong major
voting rights decisions, only Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Bolden, which
even  Thernstrom admits offers little gu idance on how  to determ ine  intent, w ou ld
survive.  
     In the Civil Rights Cases, which overturned  the  1875  na tional pub lic
accommodations law , Justice Joseph B rad ley  announced that after slavery and its
"concomitants" had been abolished, "there must be some stage in the progress of
[the African-Am erican's] elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and
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ceases to be the  special favorite of the laws, and w hen h is rights as a  citizen, or a
man, are to be protec ted in  the o rdinary modes by w hich  other m en's rights a re
protected ."86  In an eerie echo of Bradley, Thernstrom asks rhetorically "how m uch
special protection  from white  competition  are  black  cand ida tes en titled to?"  C ivil
rights  advocates, she says, shou ld " trust in the  po litical process left substantially  to
its own dev ices ."87  Like Bradley, she would remove most of the legislative and
judicial protections of the most recent Reconstruction.
     Thernstrom's account suffers from her failure to set out explicit models for the
determination of intent, of the normal course of policy development, and of the
consequences of policy changes.  All of these difficulties would have been avoided
had she explicitly compared experiences in the two R econstructions, especially the
unraveling of the F irst.  
     One of the primary reasons for the length and heat of the controversy over the
original intent of the Fourteenth Am endment is that Republican mem bers of
Congress and of the state legislatures that ratified the Amendm ent devoted
comparatively few w ords to explaining what they meant by "privileges or
immunities," "equal protection ," and "due process."  Frustratingly to m odern
scholars, they spent much more time discussing Confederate disfranchisement and
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debt.88  As the example demonstrates, the amount of attention devoted in floor
debate to one provision of a law m ay not be a good guide to its later, or even
present importance, but may represent, instead, a strategic decision on the part of
each  side to focus its rhetoric on what unites its forces  and divides  its opponen ts. 
Radical Republicans might disagree on whether the rights of corporations should be
protected, or whether schools or public places in the South ought to be integrated,
but there was no division over their refusal to pay  the debts of the secessionist
traitors.  In other instances, people may  stress what they perceive to be the strongest
or weakest facets of the bill, depending on whether they generally support or
oppose it, and each side may respond to the other's attacks.  In the controversy over
the Fair Elections Bill of 1890, Republicans concentrated on the corruption of
southern  elections , and D em ocrats  on  the  threat tha t na tional regu lation posed  to
sta tes' rights, but each did, from tim e to tim e, m ake reference  to the o ther 's position. 
Often, as the controversies over the officeholding and literacy and property test ban
provisions in the Congress that framed the Fifteenth Am endment showed,
congressmen's actions and statements were subject to more than one interpretation.
     Applied to the question of the intent of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the
subsequent amendm ents, these historical reflections suggest that expectations about
the importance of section 5 cannot be gauged by the comparatively small attention
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paid to it in  the published  committee hearings and reports or in  floor debate. 
Sou therners  brayed  incessantly  abou t states ' righ ts, while  Yankees recounted lu rid
tales of the b latantly  discrim inatory adm inistration o f literacy  tests and  harshly
condem ned  the inequity of requiring poor people to pay  for the p riv ilege o f voting.  
     The very nature of section 5 militated against clear definition, for it was an
administrative remedy designed  to p revent southern  states from using  new, as well
as fam iliar m eans of inh ibiting b lack voting pow er.  T he  few  discussions of what it
was meant to  cover, therefore, w ere  necessarily  vague.  In  his  opening  statem ent in
the House hearings, for instance, Atty. Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach, the Johnson
Adm inistration's  most importan t witness, no ted  tha t "T he  tests and  devices with
which the bill deals include the usual literacy, understanding, and interpretation
tests  that are eas ily suscep tible to man ipulation, as well as a variety of other repressive
schemes," and he prominently mentioned Gomillion.89  Inviting an even broader
interpretation, Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall declared that the changes in election
laws that would be disallowed under section 5 were not lim ited to "tests and
devices," but included such m easures  as po ll taxes, while  Katzenbach  declined  to
enumerate the sorts of changes that might be legitimate, "because there are an awful
lot of things that could be started for purposes of evading the Fifteenth Am endment
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if there is the desire to do so ."90  Even as originally introduced, therefore, section 5
seems easily open-ended enough to have covered structural changes in voting
systems.
     But the section  was am ended in  the  House in 1965 to  proh ibit not only
"qualifications or procedures for voting," but, in addition, any "standard, practice,
or procedure with respect to voting," and section 2 was similarly expanded.91  This
final language was arguably as broad as the proposal made by the ever-prescient
Don  Edw ards, to prohibit any covered jurisdiction from enacting "any election law
or ordinance different than those in force and effect on Nov. 1, 1964," a suggestion
that Edw ards said was offered in an attempt "to preclude other devices which might
be used to discriminate, such as changing the boundaries of voting districts or
qualifications for holding office." 92  Thus, the nature of the remedy established by
section 5 , its language, and  au thoritative com ments at the  relevant hearings strong ly
support Chief Justice W arren's opinion in Allen.  Combined with the cautions drawn
from the example of the framers' discussions of the Fourteenth Am endment on how
to interpret evidence about the weight that Congress intends to place on different
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parts of laws, this evidence seriously undermines Thernstrom's case about the initial
insignificance of section 5 and the exclusive concern of Congress and the Johnson
Adm inistration with getting blacks registered.93
     Suppose, for a mom ent, however, that these considerations were irrelevant, and
that an unruly Justice D epartm ent and  an ideo logically com mitted Suprem e C ourt
had  overstepped  the c lear bounds that Congress had  meant to im pose in 1965. 
W ould one  no t, then, expect to see  an  attempt in  1970  to rein  in section  5, if it cou ld
not be repealed altogether, to confine its language so clearly to pure registration and
ballot-casting  tha t Allen would be reduced to a curiosity?  Politically, conditions
would have seem ed prim ed for such a m ove, with R ichard N ixon's "Southern
Strategy" hav ing paid  such  large recen t dividends, w ith George W allace 's
segregationist follow ing  ripe fo r Repub lican harvest, with John M itchell and  Jerris
Leonard substituted for Nicholas K atzenbach  and B urke  M arsha ll at Justice, with
James Eastland and Co. still potent in the Senate.  A decade later, when the
Supreme Court, according to civil rights supporters, distorted the original intent of
section 2  in its Bolden decision, there was a tremendous outcry and a massive and
effective campaign to amend section 2 to reinstate the pre-Bolden understanding of
the law.  But although the Nixon Adm inistration and the Deep South mem bers of
Congress sought outright repeal of section 5 in 1970, no one seems to have
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proposed merely confining the bureaucracy and the Court to banning non-structural
electo ral changes, as they  would have if they  had  espoused Thernstrom 's
interpretation.94  And, of course, Congress implicitly accepted Allen by renewing the
temporary part of the law for another five years.  In her analysis of the intent of
section 5, then, Thernstrom does not take into account what did not happen , despite
its obvious relevance to her contentions.
     No sins loom as large in Thernstrom's jeremiad as the linguistic dishonesty of
the liberals.  They twisted the meaning of voting rights deliberately, she charges,
substituting a complex and controversial policy of proportional representation and
guaranteed minority officeholding for a simple and consensually-supported one of
assuring that each  individual has  a chance  to vote.  
     This indictment is misguided for two reasons:  First, nothing in morals or law
prohibits the originators of a policy from m onitoring its success and changing the
means of attaining their goa ls, or even  those goals themselves, as they  ga in
experience.  Indeed, th is is just w hat Congress and  the  Justice D epartm ent did  in
the ir efforts to  expand  black  vo ting  rights  in the 1957, 1960, and  1964  Civil R igh ts
laws, and what an earlier Congress had done, or tried to do in 1866 with the
Fourteenth Am endment, in 1867 with the M ilitary Reconstruction Acts, in 1868-69
with the sou thern state constitutions and  the  Fifteenth  Amendm ent, in 1870-72  with
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the  Enforcement Acts, in 1875 w ith the "Force Bill," and  in 1890 w ith the Fair
Elections Bill.  Unless a legislative policy emerges, full-grown, from som e Jovian
legislator's brow, that is just how policy is always set.  Voting rights policy, then,
provides  no occasion for spec ial denunciation on that ground. 
     The second reason to reject the indictment is that disfranchisement and dilution
are not pure concepts.  They not only m erge into  each other, they  are
complementary , each  increasing the o ther's effectiveness, as Thernstrom wou ld
have been forced  to admit, if she had  confronted the lengthier historical reco rd.  
     It is, in fact, her radically foreshortened perspective,95 not, as she c laim s, a
difference in d isposition  be tween her optim ism  abou t America and  the  civ il righ ts
com munity's pessimism 96 that accounts most deeply for the differences in judgment
between T hernstrom and her critics.  Two pages on the experiences of litigators
bring  her from 1957  to 1965.  T here is  no thing on R econstruction, on n ine teenth
century attempts to guaran tee the righ t to vo te, on turn of the century
disfranchisement, or on the struggles against the white primary and the poll tax,
even though the literature  on  all these subjec ts was extensive long before
Thernstrom began w riting, and even though every one of the topics demonstrated
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connec tions and overlaps between dilution and disfranch isemen t.  
     The white primary, for instance, formally disfranchised no one.  Blacks could,
under its ru les, reg ister and vote  freely  in the genera l election.  W hat it did  was to
debase the ir suffrage , to d ilute  it, by  bann ing  them from having a  chance to
influence the outcom e in  the  on ly e lection  tha t mattered , just as at-large e lections in
areas with racially polarized voting patterns do.  N or did  the  po ll tax exclude  peop le
from the polls by itself.  Instead, it made them pay for the privilege, and groups
such as blacks that had fewer mem bers who could afford to pay suffered a decline
in influence.  The poll tax, in other words, affected the worth of an individual
black 's vote by dim inish ing the power of the p rincipal group to which he belonged . 
In this sense, of course, Thernstrom's vague and unevidenced statement that "In the
American  constitutiona l trad ition , it is often  said, there  are  no  group righ ts to
representation" is misleading.97  To discourage from voting a significant proportion
of members of a group that others treat as distinct reduces the value of the vote for
every individual mem ber of that group, and vice-versa.  For members of such
groups, individua l and g roup  rights , disfranchisem ent and d ilution, are in tegrally
connec ted.  
     In brief, history, even the fairly recent history of the 1930s, 40s, and 50s,
undermines Thernstrom's absolute distinction between disfranchisement and
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dilution, and, once this distinction collapses, her chief thesis erodes and her
moralistic indictment of the civil rights proponents collapses.
     W hat of the consequences of policy change?  W hat if, as Thernstrom's critique
suggests, the Justice Department at least largely got out of the preclearance
business?  W hat if section  2 and  the F ourteenth And Fifteenth Amendm ents were
interpreted to impose an intent criterion that, Thernstrom says, approvingly, "made
cases harder to win"?  W hat if dilution of the Hispanic vote were not illegal, as
dilution of Italian or Polish votes is not illegal, on the ground that
M exican-Am ericans and Puerto Rican-Am ericans have, in Thernstrom's view, "no
legacy of disfranchisement comparable to that experienced by southern blacks..."?98
     The nineteenth century lessons, as well as the more recent aftermaths of the
destruction of the white primary in the 1940s and the literacy test in the 1960s give
one little reason to be sanguine - certainly not as sanguine as Thernstrom, who, as
Karlan  and M cC rary have devastatingly show n, has a tendency to ignore
contradictory evidence.99  But perhaps even more fundamentally, Thernstrom
mistakes the causes for racial discrimination in electoral affairs.  As the record of
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the  no rthern  Dem ocrats  on  civ il righ ts ro ll calls in the  nineteen th cen tury shows, it
was not simple racism or racial hostility that undermined support for black voting
rights , and, as a more detailed  look a t the  his tory o f late  nineteen th and  early
twentieth century disfranchisement and Jim Crow w ould dem onstrate, it was no t so
much  that southern whites hated  blacks or found contact with them  distas teful. 
Black voting rights and even legalized segregation were more matters of racial
power than o f unth ink ing  rac ial animosity.  Consequently, a  decline in  the  overa ll
level of white racism, which has obviously occurred since 1960,100 does not
guarantee the fair treatment of racial minorities if, as in the nineteenth century,
national legal and judicial safeguards were to be removed.
           Ninety-five years ago , on  tha t earlier tw enty-fifth anniversary  of a m inority
vo ting  rights  act, there w ere  few  reasons for congratu lations  or joy  am ong c ivil
rights supporters.  Today, drugs, dropouts, and disease may plague the ghettos and
barrios, the growing disparity between the econom ic and physical health of the rich
and the poor wou ld embarrass a properly sensitive nation, and social reform is as
unpopular as fiscal responsibility.  But the Second Reconstruction can boast of one
success, at least - minority group mem bers can often choose  candidates who are
their own firs t preferences.  T hey  can do so , as  their great-grandfathers could not, I
have  argued, because the  na tional legis lature and  jud iciary have  been  willing  to
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guard not only the exercise of the right to cast a ballot, but also the right not to have
the ir votes submerged  by  discrim inatory e lectoral structures .  Those who  wou ld
remove or weaken those protections had best hesitate, while they relearn or reflect
upon the nation's earlier history.
